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DUAL EMBEDDEDNESS, INFLUENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF INNOVATING 
SUBSIDIARIES IN THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION 
 
Abstract 
This study adopts a business network view to study the effects of subsidiary embeddedness on both 
subsidiary influence within the MNC and innovation-related business performance. Through 
Structural Equation Modeling we analyze subsidiary relationships connected to 85 innovation projects. 
The results show that external and corporate embeddedness are complementary contexts, although 
they affect subsidiary influence and performance differently. Whereas external embeddedness directly 
affects innovation-related business performance, corporate embeddedness strengthens the subsidiary’s 
influence within the MNC, which in turn positively relates to performance. Moreover, as the study 
also finds that external and corporate embeddedness are positively associated, it stresses the issue of 
simultaneously balancing both external and corporate relationships (i.e. dual embeddedness) to nurture 
innovation projects.  
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It is frequently argued that the ability to innovate is a source of competitive advantage, particularly in 
multinational corporations (MNCs), where innovation often occurs at the subsidiary level (Birkinshaw 
& Hood, 1998; Pearce, 1999; Schmid & Schurig, 2003). Subsidiary innovation has been associated 
with a variety of driving factors, such as autonomy (Cantwell & Mudambi, 2005; Ghoshal & Bartlett, 
1988), geographic factors or distance from headquarters (Frost, 2001; Porter & Sölvell, 1998; Prahalad 
& Doz, 1981), communication (e.g., Schultz, 2003), dynamics in the business environment (Porter, 
1990), and embeddedness in network relationships (Andersson, Forsgren, & Holm, 2002; Hallin, 
Holm, & Sharma, 2011). Our study is related to the latter stream of research and explores how the 
embeddedness of subsidiaries, during innovation development, affects the performance of innovations. 
The direct relation between embeddedness and performance is extensively discussed in the 
literature on innovation, which essentially suggests that the strength of relationships provides a 
capability for learning that enhances the ability to evaluate innovation requirements among business 
actors (Cho & Pucik, 2005; Dyer & Singh, 1998; Echols & Tsai, 2005; Moran, 2005; Uzzi, 1996). 
Departing from the argument that subsidiaries often retain corporate as well as external relationships 
(Almeida & Phene, 2004; Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008; Forsgren, Holm, & Johanson, 2005), we 
move forward by investigating the relation between the corporate and external embeddedness of those 
relationships and their concurrent effects on innovation-related business performance. We thereby 
explore the effects of embeddedness in a “dual” business context of subsidiaries, which is an 
increasingly addressed distinction in the MNC literature. For instance, Achcaoucaou, Miravitlles and 
León-Darder (2013), recently proposed an analytical framework centred on dual embeddedness for the 
analysis of subsidiary competence-creation mandates. However, as Meyer, Mudambi and Narula 
(2011) noted, there has been hardly any empirical research into the simultaneous impact of corporate 
and external embeddedness. In fact, most research has either analyzed the impact of the external 
network or the corporate network, and it is, therefore, unclear how innovations within the respective 
contexts relate to the business performance of subsidiaries. Although there seems to be a belief that 
embeddedness is positively associated with innovation performance, corporate and external 
relationships may pull subsidiary innovations in different directions, creating a ‘trade-off’ between the 
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two contexts whereby the subsidiary must balance its corporate embeddedness with its local external 
embeddedness (ibid.).  
In this study, we also propose that subsidiary influence within the MNC is a mediating mechanism 
in the embeddedness-performance relationship. One side of this mechanism concerns the fact that 
surprisingly few studies have dealt with the association between embeddedness and the ability of 
subsidiaries to influence decisions on the internal resource distribution. Hence, embeddedness for 
innovation can be viewed as a critical resource controlled by the subsidiary, which provides a 
favorable position from which the subsidiary can exercise its influence on corporate decisions 
(Andersson, Forsgren & Holm, 2007; Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008; Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1990; 
Medcof, 2001). In fact, the need to generate corporate resources may be essential as various types of 
costs occur when innovations are incorporated in business activities. Then again, these resources and 
costs may be conducive to the subsequent business performance.  
Thus, the purpose is to investigate the described gaps above by testing a structural model including 
the relation between corporate and external embeddedness of subsidiaries, and the direct and indirect 
(via subsidiary corporate influence) effects of the two types of embeddedness on innovation-related 
business performance. Our study contributes to the field of embeddedness and performance: by 
analyzing and comparing embeddedness of innovations in the corporate and external contexts of 
subsidiaries, this research sheds light on the respective importance of these contexts. This is of 
particular relevance also to the field of subsidiary development and the literature on subsidiary roles 
for competence creation and influence (Holm & Pedersen, 2000; Foss & Pedersen, 2002; Birkinshaw, 
Hood & Young, 2005; Cantwell & Mudambi, 2005). Our analysis particularly brings to the fore 
subsidiary influence as a mediating factor between the embeddedness and performance of innovation, 
which, to the best of our knowledge, has not been done extensively before. 
The results show that corporate and external embeddedness are complementary contexts, although 
they affect performance differently. Whereas external embeddedness directly affects innovation-
related business performance, corporate embeddedness strengthens the subsidiary’s influence within 
the MNC, which positively relates to performance. The research presented here outlines the difficulty 
and importance of simultaneously balancing both external and corporate relationships, i.e. dual 
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embeddedness, to nurture subsidiaries’ innovation projects and capabilities. This has implications for 
managers’ strategic choices for investment in long-term collaboration for innovation in corporate 
versus external contexts. 
The study starts by discussing the theme of innovation and subsidiary embeddedness in the MNC. 
We then develop a set of hypotheses to explain the relations between corporate and external 
embeddedness, subsidiary influence over innovation-related investments, and business performance of 
innovation usage. These hypotheses are tested in a structural model based on a sample of 85 
innovation projects taking place in 23 MNCs. The investigation ends by drawing conclusions and 
discussing the managerial implications, together with issues for future research. 
 
2. INNOVATION AND SUBSIDIARY EMBEDDEDNESS 
This study conceptualizes ‘innovation development’ as the process of transforming an idea into a 
completed form that is acceptable to potential adopters, such as customers and corporate sister units. 
The ‘completed form’ may be manifested as the change in a process and in the outcome of a process, 
related to industrial production and/or exchange (Zander, 1991). Innovations can be classified 
according to many dimensions. The most common typology distinguishes between product, process, 
and service innovations (von Hippel, 1994). Innovations lead to change or deviation from a firm’s 
existing competencies, which may be described as incremental or radical (e.g., Anderson & Tushman, 
1990; Garcia & Calantone, 2002). These changes represent novelty in relation to users and are often 
believed to lie at the heart of competition, economic development, and firms’ competitiveness. Hence, 
there is a relationship between innovation and performance (Cho & Pucik, 2005; Fiol & Lyles, 1985; 
Hertenstein, Platt, & Veryzer, 2005; Figueiredo & Brito, 2011). In business terms, the success of an 
innovation could be manifested as profits, sales, market share, and positioning (e.g., Kessler, Bierly, & 
Gopalakrishnan, 2000). For instance, a product innovation could be evaluated through its ability to 
retain existing customers or attract new ones, because an increase in the quality of a product, or the 
adoption of a new design or function, is often a determinant in capturing customers. Likewise, an 
innovation may reduce the costs of a production process and improve a company’s competitive ability 
through better margins. 
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Innovation and, increasingly, the management of the innovation process are being recognized as 
core elements in shaping the competitive advantage of an MNC. A considerable amount of research 
has been devoted to the study of the managerial side of processes that may lead to innovation. In 
particular, since innovation is considered a highly strategic tool, many scholars have investigated how 
specific factors in the context surrounding innovation may shape an innovation and enhance subsidiary 
innovativeness (e.g., Brown & Eisenhardt, 1995; Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1988). MNC researchers often 
argue that innovative activity increasingly resides in operative subsidiaries, and they also stress the 
particular importance of the external environment (e.g., Andersson et al., 2002; Frost, Birkinshaw, & 
Ensign, 2002; Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1990). In connection with this, it has been argued that interaction 
and tight cooperation in the network relationships are fundamental for innovations (von Hippel, 1988). 
Therefore, a subsidiary’s ability to innovate is largely based on the quality of interaction and, 
consequently, on the depth of its relationships with its counterparts. 
The importance of relationships has been discussed in the literature on social networks, which 
assumes that economic exchange is affected by the history of exchange and the expectations of future 
exchange (e.g., Granovetter, 1985). Such contextualization of business exchange has been termed 
embeddedness, which is frequently described as a strategic resource that is important for information, 
innovation, and power, among other things, and is often separated into the dimensions of structural 
and relational embeddedness. Whereas structural embeddedness reflects how a firm’s relationships are 
connected in the architecture of the overall network structure (Granovetter, 1985; Simsek, Lubatkin, & 
Floyd, 2003; Uzzi, 1997), relational embeddedness emphasizes the quality of the firm’s dyadic 
relationships (Fjeldstad & Sasson, 2010). In this distinction, research on structural embeddedness 
often considers the brokering and diffusion of innovations, and the advantage of a position in the 
network rather than the advantage from exchange in individual relationships (Granowetter, 1992; 
Moran, 2005).  
In line with Granowetter (1985), we adopt a relational understanding of embeddedness, 
emphasizing that economic behavior is closely embedded in networks of interorganizational relations. 
As argued above, relational embeddedness is critical for learning processes that are characterized by 
the exchange of less tangible resources and the development of a shared understanding of innovation 
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usage (Gulati, 1998). This is particularly important for entrepreneurial behavior and for explaining 
innovation-oriented tasks (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1995; Hansen, 1999; Takeishi, 2001). Embeddedness 
in relationships, therefore, comprises the development of new knowledge with the potential to create 
value for the subsidiary, but potentially also for the MNC as a whole, too. In accordance with this 
view, research on innovation has commonly adopted embeddedness as an explanatory factor in the 
analysis of innovation development and performance (Bonner, Orville, & Walker, 2004). During 
recent years, the concept has also been adopted into studies of the MNC, especially in the fields of 
knowledge and innovation, often addressing the impact of the subsidiary as a generator of novelty 
(Figueiredo, 2011; Garcia-Pont, Canales, & Noboa, 2009; Meyer et al., 2011; Nell, Ambos, & 
Schlegelmilch, 2011). Thus, our use of relational embeddedness is aligned with that of researchers 
who state that such embeddedness influences which resources will be accessed through interaction 
with other organizations and the extent to which this occurs (Granovetter, 1992; Podolny, 2001; 
Rowley, Behrens, & Krackhardt, 2000). 
We view relationships as inter-organizational phenomena in the sense that subsidiary managers 
organize and manage innovations through exchange in the relationships with other corporate 
organizations (corporate embeddedness) and external business counterparts (external embeddedness). 
Hence, embeddedness concerns relationships at the organizational level and centers on the innovation 
development within those relationships. Our focus on innovation is in line with contemporary 
research, which often separates embeddedness into different dimensions and mechanisms depending 
on the choice of analytical focus (e.g. Heidenreich, 2012; Zukin & DiMaggio, 1990). It has, 
furthermore, been pointed out that embeddedness should be understood as a process in which the 
actions of agents (i.e. subsidiaries) are not totally determined by the surrounding network 
(Heidenreich, 2012). This means that embeddedness does not contradict the active role of a subsidiary 
that also creates its embeddedness through strategic choice and investment in counterpart interaction 
(Heidenreich, 2012; Garud, Hardy & Maguire, 2007; Kostova, Roth & Dacin, 2008). This study 
thereby focuses on innovation in the context of relational embeddedness: it addresses the development 
of business related activities, such as the creation of new products or production technologies. 
Evidently, embeddedness implies the use of resources, as it requires managerial time and investment 
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in collaborative arrangements. An actor is, therefore, likely to select relatively few relationship 
counterparts with which it organizes mutual innovation processes.  
This implies that embeddedness will vary across subsidiary relationships and across subsidiaries, 
depending on the level of available resources, experiences and specific needs. Certain subsidiaries will 
organize innovations development through embeddedness in corporate relationships, external 
relationships, or in both contexts (Takeishi, 2001; Tidd, 1995). Although embeddedness reflects the 
same basic mechanism for innovation in each of the two contexts, the importance of the respective 
context may vary. In the following, we distinguish between these contexts and argue that the 
embeddedness in the external and the corporate contexts is associated with the business performance 
and influence on intra corporate resource distribution of subsidiaries.    
 
3. DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
3.1. Embeddedness and Innovation Performance  
Whereas a positive relation between embeddedness and innovation performance has been observed in 
the literature on innovation, the context of the MNC unfolds a complicated situation where an 
innovating subsidiary must balance its resource-demanding activities against both its market- and 
corporate roles. In essence, this means that the deployment of new innovations is potentially affected 
by the qualities of both the corporate and the external networks. As far as external embeddedness is 
concerned, it has been argued that the launching of innovations creates uncertainty among related 
market actors and that embeddedness of an innovating actor in market relationships decreases such 
uncertainty, since embeddedness increases the mutuality in motivation and the willingness to share 
information and commit resources to mutual problem-solving (Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000; Uzzi, 1997). 
Consequently, external embeddedness decreases the risk of negative market reactions (Simsek et al., 
2003) as the innovation becomes more achievable among business actors (Pinch et al, 2003). It 
therefore increases the likelihood of exploiting the innovation and, thus, the potential business 
performance (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998). However, embeddedness requires 
investment in mutual technologies, business procedures and learning processes and is therefore not 
created overnight (Forsgren et al., 2005). Furthermore, it is not a feature that is developed in all 
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exchange relations. Subsidiaries will consequently vary in their levels of external embeddedness 
(Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008; Helble & Chong, 2004): some will conduct business exchange without 
committing their business development to deep relationships, whereas others will devote considerable 
resources into such processes. We argue that the degree to which subsidiary innovation development is 
embedded in external relationships will influence the subsidiary’s ability to incorporate the resulting 
innovations into its business activities. This is in line with Dyer and Hatch (2006), who argued that 
network capabilities can contribute to the sustained competitive advantage of firms, as well as 
Cantwell and Janne (1999) and Andersson et al. (2002), who argued that embeddedness in valuable 
and competence-rich relationships is a potential source of competitive advantage. This leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1a. There is a positive relationship between the external embeddedness of a 
subsidiary’s innovation-related activities and the subsidiary’s innovation-related business 
performance.  
 
According to Garcia-Pont et al. (2009), corporate embeddedness is an overlooked, but relevant, factor 
for the development of subsidiary-specific advantage. However, whereas these authors deal with 
corporate embeddedness as by considering it to be the formation of subsidiary strategy, distinguishing 
between strategic, capability and operational embeddedness, our viewpoint considers corporate 
embeddedness as an integrating mechanism that creates the awareness and ability to communicate 
business-related innovation requirements and opportunities. As is the case with external 
embeddedness, subsidiaries will, to varying degrees, develop specific relationships with corporate 
counterparts (Tsai, 2001), such as peer units, corporate suppliers, customers, R&D units and 
headquarters1. We thereby argue that corporate embeddedness will provide subsidiaries access to 
existing resources within the MNC and will make it possible to combine capabilities through 
collaboration (Barney, 1991; Cantwell, 1994; Foss 1999; Kogut & Zander, 1993). This facilitates 
                                                     
1
 Corporate embeddedness is sometimes restricted to the analysis of lateral relationships (see, for example, 
Forsgren et al., 2005). The present study also includes the subsidiary’s relationships with headquarters. 
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responsiveness vis-à-vis the subsidiary’s business-related needs, which is the same mechanism as for 
external embeddedness. In comparison with external embeddedness, the organizing of innovations 
through intra-corporate relationships occurs at a distance from the subsidiary’s market. We may still 
assume that the corporate embeddedness provides an innovation-related advantage that can be utilized 
when implemented in business activities. This reasoning is in line with the finding that intra-firm 
communication is important for successful product innovation (Fidler & Johnson, 1984; Hillebrand & 
Biemans, 2004; Schulz, 2003) and for the adoption of innovations by subsidiaries (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 
1988). This is also consistent with Monteiro, Arvidsson, and Birkinshaw (2008), who found a strong 
positive relation between a subsidiary’s level of knowledge exchange in the MNC and the subsidiary’s 
financial performance. Further, Ciabuschi, Dellestrand and Martín Martín (2011) found that corporate 
embeddedness, brought about through the involvement of headquarters during the innovation 
development, was positively related to innovation outcomes that strengthen the competitive advantage 
of a subsidiary. 
We conclude that the corporate embeddedness of subsidiaries during innovation development is 
positively associated with the subsidiary’s innovation-related business performance. 
 
Hypothesis 1b. There is a positive relationship between the corporate embeddedness of a 
subsidiary’s innovation-related activities and the subsidiary’s innovation-related business 
performance.  
 
3.2. Embeddedness, Subsidiary Influence and Innovation Performance 
The role of subsidiary influence within the MNC where innovation-related performance is concerned 
will be discussed in two steps: we first discuss the relationship between external and corporate 
embeddedness and subsidiary influence, respectively, and then we consider the relation between 
subsidiary influence and innovation performance. 
The external embeddedness of subsidiaries has been increasingly addressed as a managerial issue 
in the literature on MNCs (Meyer et al., 2011; Nell et al., 2011). In the present study, we argue that 
when the innovations of a subsidiary are embedded in external relationships, it holds a bridgehead 
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position between the MNC and the external network. The subsidiary’s exclusive access to the 
competences and processes of innovation development in external relationships are resources that 
create a dependence on the subsidiary of the rest of the MNC and its headquarters, which improves the 
ability of a subsidiary to exercise influence on corporate decisions (Andersson et al., 2007; Bouquet & 
Birkinshaw, 2008). This is in line with the resource-dependence theory, in which an actor’s control 
over resources that are of importance for others is the basis for that actor’s ability to influence 
corporate decision-making (Anderson & Narus, 1990; Astley & Sachdeva, 1984). Hence, it may be 
essential for the subsidiary to exercise its influence over the resource distribution because innovations 
often require technological and organizational adjustments that are directly associated with increasing 
costs. In connection to this, we argue that the extent to which innovations stem from external 
relationships controlled by a particular subsidiary could determine the extent to which headquarters 
would be expected to pay attention to that subsidiary (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008; Ocasio, 2011). 
This will lead to a deeper headquarters-subsidiary relationship with greater exchange of information 
between the two managerial levels (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998). In this way, the managerial relationship 
between headquarters and the subsidiary provides a gateway to knowledge about innovation 
development, which in itself creates a basis for bargaining power in rent-seeking negotiations 
(Cantwell & Mudambi, 2005; Mudambi & Navarra, 2004). Based on headquarters’ recognition of the 
subsidiary’s innovation capability in external relationships, then, the subsidiary can have a voice and 
engage in political games (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Medcof, 2001). In accordance, prior research 
has argued that external embeddedness is a criterion that a company’s headquarters may use when 
selecting which subsidiaries to concentrate its managerial effort upon (Andersson et al., 2007).  
Hence, the inherent influence of a subsidiary is based on its control over innovation processes in its 
relationships and in the headquarters’ understanding of the development of innovative activities in 
those relationships (Forsgren & Holm, 2010; Medcof, 2001), as well as the fact that the position of the 
subsidiary cannot be easily altered (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). This conclusion is consistent with the 
seminal article by Ghoshal and Bartlett (1990), which suggested that the density of exchange 
relationships with local partners is an important basis of subsidiary power. They argued that, as the 
subsidiary is the link to external resources of this type, it has a strong base from which to exercise 
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influence over the internal resource distribution within the MNC. Therefore, we argue that the extent 
to which the external embeddedness of a subsidiary supports the development of critical capabilities 
for innovation is positively associated with the subsidiary’s ability to influence innovation-related 
decisions.  
 
Hypothesis 2a. There is a positive relationship between the external embeddedness of a 
subsidiary’s innovation-related activities and the subsidiary’s influence over innovation-related 
decisions in the MNC.  
 
The above reasoning is essentially also valid for corporate embeddedness. To the extent that a 
subsidiary’s innovations are embedded within the corporate network, it plays an integrated role of 
strategic importance. In comparison with the external embeddedness, it signifies less of a bridgehead 
position, since it concerns corporate relationships. In contrast with external embeddedness, under 
normal circumstances, we can expect headquarters to have its own relationships with the corporate 
actors with which the subsidiary has relationships, and to possess greater knowledge of the mutual 
innovation processes. This important integrated role relates to the literature on research into centres of 
excellence, which basically suggests that subsidiaries that are able to manage knowledge and 
competence flows with the purpose of innovation will generate strategic roles within the corporate 
network and have an increased influence over investments and resource allocation (Frost et al., 2002). 
We thereby assume that there is a connection between the corporate embeddedness of a subsidiary’s 
innovation process and its ability to acquire and distribute relevant knowledge within the corporation, 
and thus to gain attention from headquarters (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008). In consequence, the 
corporate embeddedness of subsidiary innovation increases the dependence on the subsidiary, which 
strengthens the subsidiary’s ability to influence innovation-related decisions. This has also been 
expressed as the ‘strategic embeddedness’ of a subsidiary (Garcia-Pont et al., 2009). Thus, we 




Hypothesis 2b. There is a positive relationship between the corporate embeddedness of a 
subsidiary’s innovation-related activities and the subsidiary’s influence over innovation-related 
decisions in the MNC.  
 
We now turn to the effect of subsidiary influence on innovation performance. To the extent that 
headquarters is a recipient of influence from several resource-demanding subsidiaries, it might need to 
prioritize its innovation prospects. As argued above, innovations may be associated with uncertainty 
about potential applications, and, therefore, also with difficulties predicting market potentials. 
Considering this, the distribution of resources to sanction a subsidiary innovation can be associated 
with risky prospects because of the considerable effort and the costs associated with overcoming the 
structural inertia, both within and outside the MNC (Simonin, 1999; Teece, 1977). Still, the ability of a 
subsidiary to generate additional resources by influencing corporate decisions can be conducive for the 
integration of an innovation into business operations and may represent a strong potential for 
improved business performance. Such resources can allow for innovation-related investments in 
products, production, and marketing procedures or organizational changes, which enhance the 
implementation of an innovation and the subsequent business performance. In fact, the adoption of an 
innovation may take time and require considerable resources, especially when innovations are unique 
and require adaptation among network actors (Hallin et al., 2011). Stieglitz and Heine (2007) found 
that when the requisite complementary resources are in place, firms are better able than their 
competitors to engage in internationally generated growth from their innovations. Therefore, we 
propose a positive link between the influence a subsidiary has on the distribution of MNC resources 
for innovation-related investments and the business performance of the innovations.  
 
Hypothesis 3. There is a positive relationship between the subsidiary’s influence over the 
innovation-related decisions in the MNC and the subsidiary’s innovation-related business 
performance. 
 
3.3. Subsidiary External and Corporate Embeddedness 
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An important factor in the analysis is the degree of interrelation between external and corporate 
embeddedness in the development of an innovation. The two contexts can be interpreted as a dual role 
of the subsidiary. Although both roles are driven by business exchange, the corporate role is also 
influenced by administrative and strategic ‘obligations’ that arise because it belongs to an MNC 
(Kogut & Zander, 1993; Porter & Fuller, 1986). We proceed with the association between external and 
corporate embeddedness and consider whether these are complementary or subject to a trade-off2. 
One could argue that the more a subsidiary is embedded in the corporate network for its innovation, 
the less it needs to engage in external relationships, and vice versa. The subsidiary may also face 
different and incompatible business interests within the two networks, which can create a dilemma in 
that the impact stemming from external and corporate embeddedness can emerge in a conflict 
(Forsgren et al., 2005). When the embeddedness exists in both networks, i.e. dual embeddedness, the 
subsidiary must manage and combine the interests stemming from corporate and external activities to 
ensure that it pursues consistent goals. This may require considerable resources for coordination, and 
to handle problems associated with the adoption of the innovation among both corporate and external 
actors (Helble & Chong, 2004). In some cases, when manifold actors in the corporate and external 
environment are concerned with the development activities, the coordination costs may become 
prohibitively large. In order to keep these coordination costs at a reasonable level, the subsidiary may 
have to focus its innovation processes on the concerns of relationships either within the MNC or 
external to it. In considering sources of knowledge, Gammelgaard and Pedersen (2010) found that 
subsidiaries use external knowledge to a lesser degree if they rely heavily on internal knowledge. 
Their explanation was based on the argument that the MNC and the external network constitute two 
institutional obstacles: the more a subsidiary relies on one context, the fewer the resources that might 
be made available to engage in the other. Therefore, devoting resources to innovative activities 
through embedded relationships in one context will mean that limited resources can be distributed to 
                                                     
2
 In the following paragraphs, we propose a negative and a positive relation between external and corporate 
embeddedness. Figure 1 portrays this as a link in which external embeddedness affects corporate embeddedness, 
although the causal direction of the relation may be reversed. The effect of this relation, including an 
interpretation of the reverse direction, is commented in the concluding section on pp.25.   
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innovative activities within the other. On this basis, a negative relation is expected between corporate 
and external embeddedness with regard to the development of any particular innovation. 
 
Hypothesis 4a. There is a negative relationship between the external embeddedness and the 
corporate embeddedness of a subsidiary’s innovation-related activities. 
 
Another line of reasoning is that the legal boundary of an MNC does not divide the network of a 
subsidiary into two distinct contexts (Asakawa, 2001; Helble & Chong, 2004), especially when 
considering a single function (namely, innovation development). For the purpose of innovation, then, 
the corporate border may not have a boundary effect, which may enable a subsidiary to develop a high 
degree of corporate embeddedness while still being embedded in the external business network. This 
may actually be necessary, as subsidiaries sometimes need to combine their resources and 
competences with those in other parts of the MNC in order to support their external activities, and vice 
versa (Cantwell, 1994). This is likely when the subsidiary’s corporate and external business networks 
are interdependent; that is, when the networks are connected in such a way that changes in the 
activities in external relationships introduce changes in corporate ones, or vice versa (Cook & 
Emerson, 1978). The stronger the interdependence, the more likely it is that the activities in the 
corporate and external business networks will be shaped to ensure ‘consistency’. Embeddedness in 
both contexts will be important as it facilitates the diffusion of information throughout the network 
and provides a better insight into entrepreneurial action (Simsek et al., 2003). What counts, therefore, 
is how relationships are connected through, for instance, knowledge and resource exchange, rather 
than whether they are kept apart by the legal border of the firm. We propose that subsidiaries that 
pursue innovative roles in the MNC will consider the consistency between the corporate and external 
network. Cassiman and Veugelers (2006) and Frenz and Ietto-Gillies (2009) made similar arguments, 
finding support for a positive effect on innovative performance through complementarities between 




Hypothesis 4b. There is a positive relationship between the external embeddedness and the 
corporate embeddedness of a subsidiary’s innovation-related activities.  
 
Figure 1 presents and summarizes the hypothesized relationships between the constructs. 
 
("Figure 1 about here") 
 
4. METHODS 
4.1. Sample and Data Collection 
We investigated 85 innovations developed in 63 subsidiaries in 31 business divisions belonging to 23 
MNCs. Each MNC had between one and five divisions, while each division had between one and 11 
subsidiaries. The firms in the sample represented different industries. Based on the International 
Standard Industries Classification (ISIC), the 63 subsidiaries can be classified into seven main groups: 
forestry and logging (6 subsidiaries); manufacture of food products (4); manufacture of paper and 
paper products (18); manufacture of computer, electronic, and optical products (4); manufacture of 
machinery and equipment n.e.c. (21); manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers (5); 
and telecommunications (5).  
The 85 innovations investigated were developed and released by subsidiaries between 1990 and 
2004. The subsidiaries all performed their own development of the innovations included in the 
investigation that they subsequently used in their own business activities. One important criterion 
when choosing innovations to study was that they must have been used in process or marketing 
activities for at least one year; this ensured that managers had sufficient experience of the effects of 
the innovations on business performance. On average, 1.3 innovations were studied in each subsidiary, 
although the number varied between one and five depending on access to information. The 
subsidiaries were located in 14 countries, with Swedish subsidiaries accounting for 38.8 percent of the 
innovations. The remainder were released by subsidiaries in Taiwan (18.8 percent); Italy (8.2 percent); 
France and the United Kingdom (7.1 percent each); Belgium, Finland, Germany, and the United States 
(3.5 percent each); and Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Switzerland (1.2 
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percent each). On average, the subsidiary size was 571 employees, sales were 281 million Euros, the 
age of the subsidiary was 48 years, and the R&D budget was approximately 8 million Euros.  
We used purposive sampling to select MNCs that were greatly involved in technological 
development from advanced economies where the gross domestic expenditure on R&D is high. 
Initially, the MNCs were sent a formal letter asking them to participate in the study. A first meeting 
was usually held at the HQ level, with the objective of becoming acquainted with the organization and 
asking for potential respondents at the subsidiary level. Managers of the subsidiary (or divisional HQs) 
were then asked to identify innovations to be studied. The next step – choosing which subsidiary 
relationships to study – was critical, given the focus on corporate and external embeddedness of 
subsidiaries. We had to limit the number of relationships to be investigated, as it would not have been 
possible to gather information about every kind of relationship that every subsidiary has, especially as 
the study required face-to-face interviews in many countries. Therefore, for practical and analytical 
reasons, the investigation of subsidiary embeddedness was limited to concern a number of each 
subsidiary’s relational counterparts (such as customers, suppliers, and other corporate units). The 
respondents were asked to describe and assess up to six relationships that had been associated with 
innovation development. This meant that relationships were selected with regard to their importance 
for innovation without considering the degree of embeddedness. Indicators of embeddedness were 
then measured by asking the managers to characterize the relationships using our structured 
questionnaire. Hence, we wanted to capture the degree of embeddedness of relationships that had been 
important for innovation development. The respondents were also asked to indicate whether the 
relationship in question was external to or within the MNC. Out of 268 relationships identified, 121 
(45 percent) were external and 147 (55 percent) were internal to the MNC. These different sets of 
relationships (external and corporate) are used in the analysis of the subsidiary external embeddedness 
and corporate embeddedness. 
The data collection was carried out between 2002 and 2005 by nine researchers who visited the 
different countries in which the subsidiaries were located. Through face-to-face interviews, the 
interviewer was able to interact with the respondents – usually R&D managers, project managers, and 
subsidiary CEOs in charge of innovation projects and/or extensively involved in the innovation 
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development and/or transfer process – and clarify the questions when necessary. Each interview lasted 
for between two and four hours and some were complemented by a visit to the facilities and a practical 
demonstration of the innovation in question. The data was collected using a structured questionnaire 
and all the interviews were in English. The managers and CEOs were proficient in this language. To 
increase face validity, a qualitative pre-test was carried out by means of two pilot interviews with 
MNC managers. Minor changes were made in order to correct ambiguous questions and phrasing and 
to enhance the applicability of indicators.  
 
4.2. Measures 
4.2.1. External and corporate embeddedness 
Two aspects of embeddedness – ‘external’ and ‘corporate’ – were measured in the sampled 
relationships. Firstly, external embeddedness considered the depth of business-related activities within 
those external relationships. This was measured by asking respondents about (i) the extent to which 
there was closeness in the business relationship in terms of sales and purchase of goods and services, 
(ii) the degree to which the subsidiary had adapted its resources and activities to the specific 
counterpart, and (iii) whether the counterpart had been important for the subsidiary’s business for a 
long time (see Appendix A). These measures are similar to previous studies that have dealt with 
external embeddedness of a business actor (see, e.g., Andersson, Forsgren, & Holm, 2001). Secondly, 
corporate embeddedness was operationalized to capture the subsidiary’s embeddedness with MNC 
headquarters and peer units. Two indicators were used for embeddedness in the subsidiary-HQ 
relationship, and one other indicator concerned the embeddedness of relationships with peer units. The 
indicators are: (i) headquarters’ support for the interests of the subsidiary in developing the innovation, 
(ii) the frequency of interaction in cooperation with headquarters, and (iii) the temporal importance of 
the corporate counterpart for the business of the subsidiary (see Appendix A). 
Two seven-point Likert-type scales were used for each construct, ranging from 1 (totally disagree) 
to 7 (totally agree). To assess measures of external and corporate embeddedness on the ‘subsidiary-
relationship level’, the scores on the embeddedness items in each of the two sets of relationships 
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(external and corporate) were added together and then divided by the number of external and corporate 
relationships, respectively. 
 
4.2.2. Subsidiary influence 
Our measure of subsidiary influence concerns the position of the subsidiary in relation to the HQ and 
the rest of the corporation. It is generally accepted that technological knowledge is an important part 
of a firm’s competitive strategy (Porter, 1983) and that technological development is reflected in the 
development of products and production processes (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1988). Three indicators were 
adapted to measure subsidiary influence and a seven-point scale from -3 to +3 (the extremes 
corresponding to strong negative influence and strong positive influence, respectively) was used. 
Firstly, interviewees were asked to evaluate how the innovation had affected the unit’s position; this 
was done by asking about (i) the subsidiary’s advantage within the MNC in comparison to other 
corporate units. Secondly, in line with the above-mentioned previous studies on technological 
knowledge, we posed questions concerning the extent to which the innovation had positively affected 
the subsidiary’s influence concerning decisions about investments in the subsidiary’s (ii) production 
capability and (iii) R&D (see Appendix A).  
 
4.2.3. Business performance 
The literature includes a long tradition and debate about measuring performance (March & Sutton, 
1997; Richard et al., 2009). Subsidiary business performance encompasses profits and business 
volume, as well as overall competitive advantage as the outcome of, for instance, improved market 
share, positioning, and image (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1995; Ettlie, Bridges, & O'Keefe, 1984; Hitt et 
al., 1996). In the present study, the indicators of the ‘business performance’ construct account 
specifically for the impact that the innovation has on the subsidiary’s business (see Appendix A). 
Thus, the business performance of the subsidiary was not considered as a whole; we only considered 
the perceived influence of using a particular innovation in business-related activities. Other studies 
have employed similar types of assessment for business performance (e.g., Tracey, Lim, & 
Vonderembse, 2005; Yamin et al., 1997) and shown that the approach can yield useful insights. This is 
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an important distinction, not only because it makes it possible to study the phenomenon under 
consideration more readily, but also because it requires sound indicators of the actual influence of the 
innovation on the market-associated subsidiary activities. Consequently, innovation-related business 
performance is typically measured in terms of sales growth, market share, and profitability (Prajogo, 
2006; Prajogo & Ahmed, 2007). Following this, we first asked the subsidiary manager and/or the 
manager of the innovation project to estimate the extent to which the innovation had affected (i) the 
unit’s business volume in the local market, (ii) its competitive advantage on the market, and (iii) its 
operating profit. A seven-point scale spanning from -3 to +3 (corresponding to the strong negative and 
strong positive impact) was used for the three items capturing the business performance construct.  
 
4.2.4. Controls 
We included a control for the size of the firm, measured in terms of the number of employees in the 
subsidiary, to eliminate any size-related effects on the endogenous constructs. For example, subsidiary 
influence may differ between large and small subsidiaries. We also controlled for the industry to 
which the subsidiary belongs according to the classification in seven groups presented above. Given 
that some subsidiaries belong to the same division/business area and MNC, we also controlled for both 
the division and the MNC. Furthermore, innovation brings about a certain degree of novelty and a 
need for adaptation among market actors, which may improve or decrease the performance of the 
business. In so doing, we controlled for the ‘magnitude’ of the innovation by estimating the 
development cost (determined by asking whether, to develop the innovation, the interviewees had had 
to invest significantly in skilled human resources and specialized equipment and facilities). The two 
questions were measured on a seven-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). For the same reason, 
we also controlled for the type of innovation, indicating the relevance of product, process, marketing, 
and core technology innovations in the form of four dummy variables. Finally, we entered a control 
for the time since the innovation was released; this was done since older innovations may have a 





4.2.5. Common method variance 
We followed a double strategy to deal with common method variance, given that the data on the 
exogenous and dependent variables were going to be collected from the same respondents (Chang, 
Witteloostuijn, & Eden, 2010). On one hand, the design of the study enabled the constructs and their 
items to be spread out in the questionnaire and separated by other questions. Furthermore, the 
indicators reflecting the constructs business performance and subsidiary influence appeared earlier in 
the questionnaire than the measures of corporate and external embeddedness and there was therefore 
no obvious connection between these questions. In addition, the indicators were anchored in two 
different scale ranges (–3 to 3 and 1 to 7) and we used two response formats (totally disagree–totally 
agree and strong negative effect–strong positive effect). On the other hand, we performed a Harman’s 
one-factor test as a post hoc statistical procedure with the intention of testing common method 
variance (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). The results of a principal components analysis generated four 
un-rotated factors with eigenvalues over 1 and explained 65.6 percent of the variance (between 25.8 
and 9.3 percent). Twelve factors were required to explain 100 percent of the variance. Next, a 
theoretically unrelated marker variable (‘Informal communication channels make you aware of your 
performance relative to other units’) was used and this surrogate was used to statistically control for 
method variance (Podsakoff et al., 2003). We only found marginal effects on the structural parameters 
and did not observe any change in their significance. Both statistical procedures, together with the 
research design, suggest a low risk associated with this potential problem. 
 
4.3. Data Analysis Method 
The data analysis was conducted using the Partial Least Squares (PLS) method (Wold, 1982). PLS is a 
second-generation multivariate analysis technique (Fornell, 1982). Apart from the research objectives 
and the exploratory nature of the investigation, this variance-based Structural Equations Modeling 
(SEM) technique was preferred over covariance-based ones because of the small sample size and the 
non-normal distribution of most of our indicators. According to Fornell and Bookstein (1982: 440), ‘it 
avoids many of the restrictive assumptions underlying maximum likelihood techniques and ensures 




5. ANALYSIS  
We analyzed and interpreted the structural (SEM-PLS) model in two steps. In the first step, we 
evaluated the reliability and validity of the measurement model; in the second step, we tested the 
structural model (Hulland, 1999). Table 1 reports the statistics for the individual loadings (the item 
reliability values) for the measurement model. All correlations between constructs and items were 
statistically significant and over the minimum acceptance threshold of 0.50 (ibid.). Nevertheless, 
‘Perf3’ (0.62) and ‘Influen1’ (0.69) are below the more reliable cutoff point of 0.70. However, their 
loadings have highly significant t-values (5.50 and 5.87 respectively, p < 0.001) and their constructs’ 
Average Variance Extracted (AVE) are clearly above the suggested 0.5 level. In view of these results, 
we preferred to retain both indicators in the operationalization of their respective constructs. 
 
("Table 1 about here") 
 
Construct reliability is presented in the third column of Table 1. Composite reliability values 
(Werts, Linn, & Jöreskog, 1974) are over the suggested bounds, ranging between 0.77 for ‘corporate 
embeddedness’ and 0.81 for ‘subsidiary influence’. Convergent validity was tested using the measure 
of the construct variance associated with its indicators or AVE (Fornell & Larcker, 1981), with values 
clearly over the 0.5 threshold. Finally, regarding the discriminant validity of the constructs, Appendix 
B reveals that the constructs and measures are well within the accepted range of values for the 
conditions to be met. At this point, therefore, it was possible to state that the measures are reliable and 
valid3. 
We continued the analyses by testing the structural model, which includes the hypothesized 
relationships. Several paths are statistically significant as shown by a 500 sub-sample bootstrap. These 
are the relationships between ‘external embeddedness’ and ‘business performance’ (H1a); ‘corporate 
embeddedness’ and ‘subsidiary influence’ (H2b); ‘subsidiary influence’ and ‘business performance’ 
                                                     
3
 Also, the ‘development cost’ control demonstrated good metric properties: item reliabilities = 0.87 and 0.86; 
composite reliability = 0.86; AVE = 0.75. 
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(H3), and external embeddedness’ and ‘corporate embeddedness’ (H4b); However, the relations 
associated with hypotheses H2a (β = -0.10, p > 0.1) and H1b (β = 0.03, p > 0.1) were not empirically 
supported, and were consequently dropped. Only the significant relationships were retained for a 
second round of estimation. This second test provided significant relations for all of the remaining 
paths (see Figure 2).  
("Figure 2 about here") 
 
("Table 2 about here") 
 
Considering the results in greater detail, the analysis supports Hypothesis 1a (see Table 2), which 
indicates that the embeddedness of a subsidiary’s innovation on its external relationships is positively 
associated with the innovation-related business performance (β = 0.30, p < 0.05). Interestingly, 
corporate embeddedness was not found to have a similar effect, which means that Hypothesis 1b is not 
supported, as pointed out above. Hypothesis 3 is supported (β = 0.31, p < 0.01), which indicates that 
business performance is positively associated with the subsidiary’s ability to influence headquarters’ 
innovation-related investment decisions (see Table 2). 
The analysis further shows that external embeddedness does not directly affect the subsidiary’s 
ability to influence innovation-related investment decisions. Hence, no support was found for 
Hypothesis 2a whilst Hypothesis 2b was supported (see Table 2), since corporate embeddedness is 
positively related (β = 0.23, p < 0.05) to subsidiary influence. Furthermore, the support for Hypothesis 
4b (β = 0.39, p < 0.01) (but not for 4a) indicates a positive link between external and corporate 
embeddedness4; this suggests that a subsidiary combines corporate capabilities with external 
capabilities for the purpose of innovation development (see Table 2). Finally, the indirect effect of 
corporate embeddedness on innovation-related business performance can be quantified as 0.07. 
The analysis also reveals some significant effects of two control variables (see Table 2). Firstly, the 
magnitude of the innovation in terms of development cost is positively associated with the subsidiary’s 
                                                     
4
 The statistical results for the hypothesized model are identical to those obtained when the relationship is 
reversed in the specified model and tested as corporate embeddedness influencing external embeddedness. 
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ability to influence corporate decisions (β = 0.39, p < 0.001). Hence, subsidiary influence is not only 
affected by the corporate embeddedness of innovation development, but it is also related to the 
magnitude of the innovation per se. Secondly, process innovation is the only type of innovation that 
seems to affect the model. This type of innovation is negatively associated with the business 
performance of the subsidiary’s innovation (β= -0.30, p < 0.01), which indicates that the adoption of 
new production processes may be more risky than other types of innovation. However, the control for 
subsidiary size and the time (duration) since the innovation was released had no significant effect on 
the endogenous constructs. Finally, the industry in which the subsidiary operates and the division and 
MNC to which it belongs – which were tested using a jack-knifing procedure in which we iteratively 
excluded an industry (division/MNC) – confirmed the stability of the parameter estimates. 
Table 2 also shows the level of variance explained, and the Stone-Geisser Q2 for the resulting 
structural model. Firstly, with respect to the quantity of variance explained by the model (R2), PLS 
provides the following values: 0.243 for ‘business performance’; 0.222 for ‘subsidiary influence’ and 
0.153 for ‘corporate embeddedness’. The Stone-Geisser Q2 statistics for the predictive relevance of the 
dependent constructs (Stone, 1974), which were estimated by fixing the omission distance at six 
observations for the blindfolding technique, is negative for the three endogenous constructs. This 
technique assesses the validity of the paths by repetitively estimating the model parameters with 
random data points omitted (that is, taking what is known as hold-out samples). The negative cross-
validated redundancies suggest that other constructs that were not included in the model could explain 
part of its variance. This is a natural consequence of the fact that our purpose was not to identify the 
determinants of the endogenous constructs to our best ability, but to test a set of relations between the 
constructs included in the specified model. 
 
6. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
6.1. Discussion of the findings 
This study has investigated how the embeddedness of subsidiaries during innovation development 
affects the performance of innovations. Whereas there is a general postulation that embeddedness is 
conducive for knowledge exchange and innovation-related activities, the adoption of embeddedness in 
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prior studies of the MNC has revealed little understanding about the difference in effects of the 
external and corporate embeddedness of subsidiaries. Moreover, although subsidiary influence over 
corporate decisions has been an integral part of the research on subsidiary roles in the MNC, only a 
few studies have related this to the issue of embeddedness and performance. The present study, 
therefore, answers to the call for research on subsidiary dual embeddedness and has done so by 
investigating the relations between corporate and external embeddedness and, via the subsidiary’s 
influence on corporate decisions, the business performance of innovations.  
The results confirm that the distinction and inclusion of corporate and external embeddedness of 
subsidiary innovations is conducive to the analysis of business performance. We find that the 
innovation-related business performance is positively associated with the external embeddedness of 
innovation development. The logic is that when subsidiaries become embedded within a network in 
which they also conduct business, they are better able to evaluate the needs and requirements of their 
business counterparts, and they will share innovation-related interests to a higher extent. This is in line 
with findings of such authors as Andersson et al. (2002) and Peng and Luo (2000). However, it is in 
contrast with studies that have reported: a negative association between relational embeddedness and 
firm performance (Rowley et al., 2000) or that innovations may be profitable even if they are not 
adapted to external requirements (Szulanski & Jensen, 2006). The test also showed that corporate 
embeddedness had no direct effect on innovation-related business performance, however, it does 
appear that corporate embeddedness is a predictor of subsidiary influence (while external 
embeddedness is not significantly related to subsidiary influence), which in turn is positively related to 
business performance. The rationale of the second effect is that the possibility of the subsidiary to 
collect resources for innovation-related investments within the MNC organization will improve the 
innovation implementation and its subsequent business performance.  
These findings indicate that corporate and external embeddedness differ in their effects on business 
performance. While we only can speculate why this is the case, it can be argued that external 
embeddedness is closely associated to market actors, who through their embeddedness with the 
subsidiary are an integral part of its innovation development and will consequently be committed in 
the adoption of the innovation and its related business exchange. Although corporate embeddedness 
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may also account for evaluations of needs and requirements of subsidiary business counterparts, it 
does not directly involve market customers and other external actors. Hence, when an innovation is 
launched without external embeddedness as a driving feature, the subsidiary’s knowledge generated 
from market relationships is less insightful. 
The results are also interesting in relation to the literature on the subsidiary’s role in the MNC. 
Prior research has essentially indicated that subsidiaries sometimes become new centers in the creation 
and distribution of knowledge within the firm, and that they may exercise an influence over corporate 
decisions. There seems to be consensus on the fact that such subsidiaries often generate critical 
knowledge through external relationships. Our findings bring a more detailed picture: external 
embeddedness is not directly related to subsidiary influence over the distribution of resources, whereas 
corporate embeddedness is, and serves as an indirect driver of innovation-related business 
performance. Hence, the strength of the subsidiary’s influence is closely associated to its corporate 
embeddedness. Although external embeddedness is essential for the business performance of an 
innovation, the generation of internal resources is correspondingly important and corporate 
embeddedness is an essential factor behind this. The subsidiaries that are able to hold a strong position 
of both external and corporate embeddedness are probably in a favorable situation.         
Moreover, the intriguing observation that external and corporate embeddedness are positively 
associated suggests that subsidiaries sometimes combine corporate capabilities with external ones for 
the purpose of innovation development (Cantwell, 1994). There seems to be a rationale in creating 
close and cooperative relationships on both sides of the legal border of the MNC, which contradicts 
the view that the external and corporate embeddedness are merely in conflict with one another or 
subject to a trade-off between them, and thereby pose a managerial dilemma (Heble & Chong, 2004; 
Gammelgaard & Pedersen, 2010; Meyer et al., 2011). The study presented here suggests that the 
interplay between external and corporate embeddedness plays an important role. A subsidiary that 
suffers from weak influence over resource distribution may find it meaningful to purposefully manage 
the connections between internal and external relationships. Moreover, we can posit that 
embeddedness in only one of the two contexts may provide insufficient variation of supporting 
capabilities for innovation development. Forsgren et al. (2005), Foss (1999), and Richardson (1972) 
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all noted that effective cooperation requires some knowledge of ‘neighboring’ capabilities, brought 
about by cooperative relations between firms that need access to complementary, but dissimilar, 
capabilities. This may require the creation of embedded relationships across corporate borders. In 
brief, the study contributes to the somewhat indistinct assumption of the relation between 
embeddedness and innovation performance, uncovering the relevance of the dual contexts of 
embeddedness. The complementarity of the subsidiary’s corporate and external networks provides a 
more fine-grained and multifaceted picture, where the innovation performance is directly related with 
external embeddedness and indirectly related with corporate embeddedness via the influence on the 
innovation investments of the subsidiary. Hence, dual embeddedness of subsidiaries is important for 
innovation performance although the external and corporate contexts affect performance differently. 
However, as we cannot determine the direction of causality between external and corporate 
embeddedness we must stress that the interpretation of the respective importance of the two contexts 
may be somewhat more complex. As there is a positive relation between these constructs it is not 
unreasonable that corporate embeddedness also may relate to business performance, indirectly, via 
external embeddedness. This addresses the question of business performance not being solely related 
to the external embeddedness of an innovation but also relying on the aligned development activities 
within the embedded corporate network. Likewise, acknowledging a positive relation between external 
and corporate embeddedness may mean that external embeddedness has an indirect positive effect on 
subsidiary influence via corporate embeddedness. Hence, when a subsidiary controls competences for 
innovation development external to the MNC it may affect the embeddedness of innovation within the 
corporate network, which indirectly strengthens its ability to exercise influence on corporate 
investments for innovation. In any case, the positive association between the external and corporate 
embeddedness is an intriguing observation that signifies the use of complementary resources across 
the corporate border.  
The study was subject to some limitations. One limitation is that we did not use probability 
sampling, which means that any generalization must be made carefully. Future studies should use 
probability sampling so that we can generalize our findings to the population of firms developing and 
transferring innovations. However, we also consider the sample and data to be a strength of the study 
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given (i) that assuming a medium effect size (Cohen, 1998), our model would require a minimum 
sample size of 76 observations (and we have 85) to obtain a power of 0.80 and an alpha level of 0.05, 
(ii) the considerable variance encountered in terms of the innovations and subsidiaries researched, and 
(iii) the meticulous personal interviews conducted by the research team. Another limitation, which is 
also common to most research in the field, concerns the cross-sectional nature of the study, which 
inhibits the ability to make causal inferences between the different exogenous and dependent 
constructs tested in the model. It should be stressed, however, that the constructs embrace a built-in 
time lag: the business performance and influence concern the subsequent usage of the innovation, 
whereas the constructs of embeddedness are related to the preceding innovation development.  
 
6.2. Managerial implications and future research 
The results have some managerial implications, particularly concerning the role of headquarters’ 
managers given that the subsidiaries exert their influence on the headquarters. We can stress that the 
influence of the subsidiary is essential to the business performance of innovations and that corporate 
embeddedness is a driving factor explaining why headquarters will distribute resources for innovation 
to certain subsidiaries. However, the study does not reveal whether the influence exercised by the 
subsidiary is contradictory to the interests of headquarters, or whether it only reflects the fact that 
corporate embeddedness of subsidiary innovations makes headquarters less ignorant about the needs 
of the subsidiary – and consequently more willing to meet those needs. 
This highlights a managerial dilemma when MNCs contain many innovative subsidiaries, which 
both provides opportunities and necessitates the introduction of cost considerations (Uzzi, 1996). On 
the one hand, if headquarters pays attention to many subsidiaries, it will enhance its learning about on-
going innovations. This may be beneficial to the individual subsidiary, but it would mean extensive 
efforts and managerial costs. Still, our study shows that corporate embeddedness, including the 
headquarters-subsidiary relationship, enhances subsidiary influence, which is conducive for effective 
investment decisions that, in turn, have a positive impact on the business performance of subsidiary 
innovations. Consequently, there is reason to stress the dilemma of how headquarters manage their 
subsidiary relationships during innovation processes and how they select the projects that they support 
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(Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008; Ciabuschi, Forsgren, & Martín Martín, 2012; Forsgren & Holm 2010; 
Mudambi & Navarra, 2004). This is an area for future research. 
Another implication for management and future research concerns the embeddedness of 
subsidiaries in both external and corporate contexts. Subsidiary resources are probably limited, which 
suggests that some subsidiaries might prioritize corporate embeddedness, gaining headquarters’ 
attention and striving to influence the resource distribution. Other subsidiaries will prioritize 
collaboration in external embeddedness instead. However, although our study identified a correlation 
between the two contexts, we lack knowledge about the complementarity between them and how 
subsidiaries invest in order to balance their impact. Extended embeddedness across corporate borders 
requires alignment between both corporate and market-related interests, which is probably a task 
requiring extensive coordination. Prior research has indicated that many subsidiaries are embedded in 
either corporate or external relationships, with only few (less than ten percent) being highly embedded 
in both contexts (Forsgren et al., 2005, pp. 115). This is valid for the configuration of corporate and 
external embeddedness in the present study, too, in which 10-20 percent of the innovations were 
highly embedded in both contexts. Hence, it seems that the potential for positive effects to arise from 
the combination of corporate and external embeddedness are not sought by many subsidiaries. The 
infrequency of dual embeddedness could, perhaps, be explained by the dilemma that mangers do not 
realize the collaborative capabilities across corporate and external relationships until the level of 
embeddedness is considerable (Dyer & Sing, 1998; Dacin, Beal, & Ventresca, 1999). Further research 
should investigate corporate and external embeddedness as complementary contexts for innovation 
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The resulting model 
 
 





































Business performance  0.79 0.57 
 Perf1 0.80   
 Perf2 0.83   
 Perf3 0.62   
Subsidiary influence  0.81 0.59 
 Influen1 0.69   
 Influen2 0.75   
 Influen3 0.85   
Corporate embeddedness   0.77 0.53 
 CEmbed1 0.72   
 CEmbed2 0.75   
CEmbed2 0.71   
External embeddedness   0.79 0.55 
 EEmbed1 0.75   
 EEmbed2 0.74   





Endogenous variables: Direct and total effects, explained variances and Stone-Geisser Q2 test 








Effects on business performance 
H1a: External embeddedness 
H3: Subsidiary influence 






















Effects on subsidiary influence 


















Effects on corporate embeddedness 
















Operationalization of the constructs and descriptive statistics 
Construct/ Indicator Mean SD Scale Label 
Business performance    Perf 
Evaluate how the innovation has affected your own unit:     
 The innovation has affected your unit business volume in your home country 
     Market 
1.44 1.07 -3 to 3 Perf1 
 The innovation has affected your unit competitive advantage on the market 2.12 0.79 -3 to 3 Perf2 
 The innovation has affected your unit operating profit 1.38 1.23 -3 to 3 Perf3 
Subsidiary influence    Influen 
Evaluate how the innovation has affected your own unit:    
 
 The innovation has affected your unit advantage within the MNC 1.55 1.05 -3 to 3 Influen1 
The innovation has affected your own unit influence on decisions about 
investments in your production capability 
0.90 1.09 -3 to 3 Influen2 
The innovation has affected your own unit influence on decisions about 
investments in your R&D 
1.16 1.09 -3 to 3 Influen3 
Corporate embeddedness (relationships within the MNC that have 
been important for the innovation) 
   CEmbed 
With regard to the corporate counterpart and innovation development, evaluate 
the following statements: 
    
HQ has fully supported your interest in developing this innovation 5.25 1.74 1 to 7 CEmbed1 
The cooperation with HQ has been characterized by frequent interaction 3.01 2.05 1 to 7 CEmbed2 
This counterpart has been important for your business for a very long time 5.29 1.64 1 to 7 CEmbed3 
External embeddedness (relationships external to the MNC that 
have been important for the innovation) 
   EEmbed 
With regard to the external counterpart, evaluate the following statements:     
You have a close business relationship in terms of sales and purchase of 
goods and services 
3.77 2.45 1 to 7 EEmbed1 
You have adapted your resources and activities very much to this 
 counterpart 
3.07 1.83 1 to 7 EEmbed2 
This counterpart has been important for your business for a very long time 3.88 2.06 1 to 7 EEmbed3 
Firm size (number of employees) 740.10 1078.04 Ratio FSize 
Development cost    DCost 
To develop the innovation technology/process know-how, you had to 
invest significantly in specialized equipment and facilities 
3.70 2.29 1 to 7 DCost1 
To develop the innovation technology/process know-how, you had to 
invest significantly in skilled human resources 
3.65 2.34 1 to 7 DCost2 






Discriminant validity: Correlations and square root of the average variances extracted (AVEa) 
Construct Perf Influen CEmbed EEmbed DCost Typeb 
Perf 0.75      
Influen 0.32 0.77     
CEmbed 0.21 0.27 0.73    
EEmbed 0.22 -0.03 0.39 0.74   
DCost 0.15 0.41 0.11 0.02 0.86  
Typeb -0.25 -0.07 0.17 0.25 0.16 1 
a: Diagonal values in bold are the square root of the variance shared between the reflective constructs and their measures. In 
order to achieve discriminant validity, the diagonal elements (square roots of AVE) must be larger than the off-diagonal ones 
(correlations).  
b: Type of innovation (process) 
 
 
